CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-A STATE STATUTE
POLITICAL LEAFLETS VIOLATES FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF POLITICAL SPEECH-McIntyre v.
BANNING

ANONYMous

Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
Speech designed to influence the electoral process is political
speech.' The United States Supreme Court has determined that
1 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-94, 196 (1992) (plurality opinion) (stating
that "the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials"
was political speech). The Supreme Court has also stated that political speech, or
"'speech concerning public affairs[,] is more than self-expression; it is the essence of

self-government.'" Id. at 196 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964)). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995)
(describing political speech as advocating a political viewpoint). Political speech
deals "explicitly, specifically and directly with politics and government." Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971).
The Supreme Court has explained the importance of political speech by describing its function as "to invite dispute." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
The Terminiello Court further described political speech as most effective "when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger." Id. The Court noted that because of the "often provocative and challenging" nature of speech "[iut may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects .... " Id. The Court concluded by stating
that the Constitution protects speech "against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Id. Otherwise, the Court
warned, "the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures,
courts, or dominant political or community groups." Id. at 4-5.
The Supreme Court often uses the term "core" political speech. See, e.g., McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 (defining "core" political speech as speech involving the
"[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates... integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution")
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 42122 (1988) (describing "the circulation of a petition [as involving] the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as
Icore political speech"') (footnote omitted). The McIntyre Court also characterized
core political speech as speech that "occupies the core of the protection afforded by
the First Amendment . . . ." Id. Additionally, the Court has stated that the First
Amendment protection of core political speech "'has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."' Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
The Court appears to make a distinction between political speech and "core"
political speech. This distinction, however, is not definitively or clearly delineated by
the Court. The Court's inexact usage of the term "core," however, has caused little
reaction by commentators, See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, §§ 13-1 to 13-31, at 1062-1153 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing "Rights of Political Participation" without addressing the Court's usage of the term "core") and Bork, supra,
at 29 (stating that "criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the
conduct of any governmental unit in the country" is "explicitly political" speech that is
the "core of the [f]irst [a]mendment"). While Professor Tribe does not discuss the
dichotomy between political speech and "core" political speech, he does address the
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political speech extends beyond mere discussions of candidates.2
More particularly, the Court has explained that political speech is
speech discussing public issues, candidates' qualifications, and issue-based elections.3
The Court has recognized that the Free Speech and Press
Clause of the First Amendment 4 protects various forms of political
practical distinctions between types of restrictions on speech. TRIBE, supra, § 12-3, at
803-04 (concluding that the distinctions may "prove arbitrary and easily manipulable") (footnote omitted). The Court's focus on the distinction appears to depend on
the speaker. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789, reh'g
denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (noting that the Court would have considered the state's
allegations if the state's legislature had made a finding supporting the claim that corporate advocacy harmed the democratic process). Professor Tribe suggests that individuals have a more established freedom of speech than groups or corporations,
TRBE, supra, § 13-29, at 1146 (noting that the Court's rationale in First Nat't Bank "left
open the possibility that, if this had been an election for public office [instead of a
referendum vote], a legislature could reasonably conclude that corporate speech corrupts or appears to corrupt candidates, and could thus constitutionally place restrictions on corporate speech that would be impermissible if applied to speech by
individuals") and, therefore, such speech is to be considered "core."
In addition to whether the speaker is an individual or a group, the distinction
between political speech and "core" political speech also appears to hinge upon the
form of the speech. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (stating that the Court can regulate elements of conduct amounting to "nonspeech" even
when other elements of the same conduct are "speech" protected by the First Amendment upon a showing of an important governmental interest). As Tribe notes, laws
restricting verbal or written speech are more closely scrutinized than laws regulating
communicative speech. TRIBE, supra, § 13-27, at 1134 (stating that there is "a dichotomy between regulation of pure speech-which would be upheld, if at all, only upon
a showing of dire necessity-and regulation of non-speech harms arising from speechrelated conduct, which was subject to considerably less exacting scrutiny"). A complete exploration of the Court's distinction between "core" and regular political
speech is not possible within the confines of a casenote.
2 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (stating that First Amendment
protections include "all such matters relating to political processes"). See also First
Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 776-77 (noting that speech designed to influence referendum
issues "is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection").
3 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519 (expanding on the definition of political speech).
See also Bork, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that "[e ] xplicifly political speech is about how
we are governed, and the category therefore includes a wide range of evaluation,
criticism, electioneering and propaganda"); Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literatureand theFirst Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 144 n.1 (1995) (noting
that core political speech "'includes discussion of candidates, structures and forms of
government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated,
and all such matters relating to political processes"') (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 21819). "IT]heconsequences of chilling free expression by attempting to purge speech
of false charges are peculiarly pronounced in the context of political elections, which
are absolutely dependent upon the free exchange of ideas that lies at the core of the
first amendment." TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-26, at 1131-32.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... " Id. Although the First Amendment was adopted in 1791
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speech.5 In particular, protected speech includes not only verbal
communication, but also nonverbal methods of communication. 6
as part of the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendments originally applied to the federal
government only. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 1688 n.1. The Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle by which the first 10 amendments are applied to the several states.
Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted in
1868. Id. § 1-2, at 5 n.10. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, as follows: "No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The
Supreme Court has elaborated on the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). In Schneider, the Court stated that
"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment . . .is
similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth [Amendment] against abridgment
by a state." Id. (footnote omitted).
Although the Supreme Court has never fully incorporated the entire Bill of
Rights within the Fourteenth Amendment's applicability, the Court has used the Bill
of Rights as a guide for defining the Due Process Clause. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 11-2,
at 772 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)). The Supreme Court
has held that the Due Process Clause protects the freedoms guaranteed by the first
eight amendments. Id. The First Amendment's protection of the freedom of speech
and press was made applicable to the states by the Supreme Court. Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925)). More specifically, "' [t] he freedom of speech ...secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, [is] among the fundamental personal
rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by a State.'" Burson, 504 U.S. at 196 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (citation omitted)).
5 Michael J. Garrison, CorporatePolitical Speech, Campaign Speech, and FirstAmendment Doctrine, 27 AM. Bus. LJ. 163, 172 n.52 (1989) (stating that "[t]he Court has
consistently recognized that speech on issues of public importance lies at the heart of
the first amendment guarantee of free speech"). See Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (stating
that "[w] hatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"); Talley v. California. 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960) (recognizing that the First Amendment protects "peaceful discussions
of public matters of importance"); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160 (stating that municipalities may "not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to
impart information through speech or the distribution of literature").
The primary goal of the First Amendment's protections of free speech is to ensure a free marketplace of ideas to preserve the democratic form of government.
Alan Howard, City of Ladue v. Gilleo: Content Discriminationand the Right to Participate
in Public Debate, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 349, 353 (1995).

See, e.g., Mills, 384 U.S.

at 219-20 (striking down a state law banning newspaper editorial directing votes on
the day of election as prohibiting speech when it would be "most effective"); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964) (discussing the requirement
that a public official prove actual malice for libel, and emphasizing the importance of
encouraging speech even when "erroneous statement[s are] inevitable"); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the protection of speech is "to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes"). See generally Bork, supra note 1 (discussing the problem of interpreting the
First Amendment's protections of speech).
6 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2041-43 (1994) (explaining that
the right of free speech includes the use of residential signs); Schneider, 308 U.S. at
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Further, the Supreme Court has determined that even certain
forms of anonymous political speech fall within the protections of
the First Amendment. 7 The Court protects political speech by applying the "strict scrutiny" test' to laws that infringe upon such
speech.9 To survive strict scrutiny, the law must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling interest.'0
The Supreme Court afforded core political speech this level of
protection in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission." There, the
Court reviewed Ohio's statutory prohibition of distributing anony164-65 (finding that municipal authorities may not abridge the right to distribute
literature); LoveU, 303 U.S. at 452 (holding that pamphlets and leaflets are protected
speech).
7 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65 (holding that identification disclosure requirements
unconstitutionally restrict the freedom of speech). Protection of anonymous political
speech is necessary because "anonymity has long been recognized as absolutely essential" to protect "unpopular groups or beliefs." TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-26, at 1019.
"[T]he risk of intimidation ... necessitates a guarantee of anonymity ...... King,
supra note 3, at 158-59 (discussing cases involving various disclosures required by
states that were struck down by the United States Supreme Court because the threat
of reprisals after disclosure would deter the exercise of free speech and association
rights). "Anonymity is the only sure defense." Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 40 (1991) (discussing past and current arguments for and against, and
effects of, disclosures). See generally Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity:
Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devi4 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961) (discussing the virtues of
disclosure and anonymity).
8 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion). The Court
applies "strict-scrutiny" to laws unduly burdening fundamental rights. Howard, supra
note 5, at 381. More specifically, in the context of the First Amendment, the Court
first presumes that any content-based law is unconstitutional. Id. at 378. Then, the
Government must show that its law serves a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. When applying strict scrutiny, the Court weighs
a state's interests with the burdens placed on the fundamental freedom of speech.
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-25 (stating that the First Amendment protection of
political speech is so great that a state is likely not able to justify a law criminalizing
the payment of petition circulators).
9 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978) (noting that strict scrutiny should be applied "[e] specially where.., a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the process of
governing") (footnote omitted). See generally King, supra note 3 (discussing protections afforded political speech). The strict scrutiny standard is also applied to laws
that regulate speech based on its content. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at 798.
10 First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 786 (explaining that the state must show "'a subordinating interest which is compelling"') (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960)); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (finding that the Government has the burden "to show the existence of such an interest") (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 (1976)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (noting that the state must "employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment"); TRIBE, supra note 1,
§ 12-3, at 799 (stating that "[s]uch restrictions are valid only if 'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest ... narrowly drawn to that end"') (quotation omitted).
11 115 S.Ct. 1511 (1995).
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mous political leaflets. 12 The Court determined that the statute
was violative of the First Amendment's protection of free speech
a referendum issue, making the
because the leaflets addressed
13
speech political in nature.
Margaret McIntyre, a resident of the Westerville, Ohio school
district,1 4 was concerned with the school district's spending.1 5 Mrs.
McIntyre distributed leaflets opposing a proposed school tax levy
to persons attending a public school meeting on April 27, 1988.16
Some of the leaflets identified her as the author, while others were
signed "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS."1 7 A school
district official who supported the proposed levy advised Mrs. McIntyre that the unsigned leaflets did not comply with the Ohio election laws.

18

In March 1989, the same school official filed a complaint with
the Ohio Elections Commission against Mrs. McIntyre, charging
that her distribution of the unsigned leaflets violated section
3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.1 9 The school official did
Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1519. The Court noted that the First Amendment, as applied to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated by the Ohio statute. Id. at 1514 n.1. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the First Amendment).
14 Brief for Petitioner at 19, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511
(1995) (No. 93-986).
15 McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1514.
16 Id. The meeting was being held at the school to consider an upcoming proposed school tax levy referendum. Id. Mrs. McIntyre drafted the leaflets on her
home computer and paid to have additional copies professionally reproduced. Id.
Her son and a friend helped distribute the leaflets in the school parking lot on car
windshields. Id. Otherwise, Mrs. McIntyre acted independently. Id.
12
13

17 Id.
18 Id.

Mrs. McIntyre distributed additional leaflets at a meeting on the following
evening. Id. After being defeated at the first two elections, the proposed levy was
passed in November 1988. Id.
19 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 152 (Ohio 1993) (stating
that the complaint was filed on March 30, 1989); McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1514 (explaining that the same school official who warned Mrs. McIntyre that her actions were in
violation of the Ohio statute filed the complaint).
Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is
designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence
the voters in any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of
financing political communications through newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of
general public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or
other non-periodical printed matter, unless there appears on such form
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not claim, nor did the Commission find, that the leaflets were false,
misleading, or libelous.2 0 The Ohio Elections Commission imposed a fine of $100 against Mrs. McIntyre and agreed with the
school official that the distribution of the unsigned leaflets violated
of publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or business address of the chairman,
treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor. The disclaimer "paid
political advertisement" is not sufficient to meet the requirements of
this division. When such publication is issued by the regularly constituted central or executive committee of a political party, organized as
provided in Chapter 3517 of the Revised Code, it shall be sufficiently
identified if it bears the name of the committee and its chairman or
treasurer. No person, firm, or corporation shall print or reproduce any
notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form
of publication in violation of this section. This section does not apply to
the transmittal of personal correspondence that is not reproduced by
machine for general distribution.
The secretary of state may, by rule, exempt, from the requirements
of this division, printed matter and certain other kinds of printed communications such as campaign buttons, balloons, pencils, or like items,
the size or nature of which makes it unreasonable to add an identification or disclaimer. The disclaimer or identification, when paid for by a
campaign committee, shall be identified by the words "paid for by" followed by the name and address of the campaign committee and the
appropriate officer of the committee, identified by name and title.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).
20 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514 (explaining that the school official complained that
the distribution was a violation of the Ohio code because the leaflets were unsigned;
the Commission agreed).
One of the leaflets, in original typeface, is as follows:
VOTE NO
ISSUE 19 SCHOOL TAX LEVY
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new buildings and expansions programs. We gave them what they asked. We knew there was crowded
conditions and new growth in the district.
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit-WHY?
We are told the 3 middle schools must be split because of over-crowding, and yet
we are told 3 schools are being closed-WHY?
A magnet school is not a full operating school, but a specials school.
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help formulate the
new boundaries. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard and came up with a very
workable plan. Their plan was totally disregarded-WHY?
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education and
welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED.
PLEASE VOTE NO
ISSUE 19
THANK YOU.
CONCERNED PARENTS
AND
TAX PAYERS
Id. at 1514 n.2.
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the Ohio law.2 1
On review, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed the decision of the Ohio Elections Commission, concluding
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre's
conduct because her actions were not misleading or deceptive.2 2
The trial court noted that the disclosures required by the statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon Mrs. McIntyre's right to free
speech .23 Accordingly, the trial court limited the application of the
statute, explaining that the statute would not apply in situations
where the author personally distributed written communications
designed to express the author's personal views.2 4
A divided Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated the fine, reasoning that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Babsi 5 was
controlling. 2 6 In Babst, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a similar statute that required the disclosure of
the name and address of the voter responsible for a political circular or advertisement.2 7 The Babst court found the statute to be
constitutional.2 8
A majority of the McIntyre appellate court noted that a more
recent United States Supreme Court decision cast doubt on the
continued validity of Babst.29 In Talley v. California,"° the Supreme
21 Id. at 1514. The Ohio Elections Commission is authorized to impose fines for

violations of section A of the applicable Ohio Revised Code section. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3599.09(C) (Anderson 1988).

22 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 WL 230505 at *1, *4
(Ohio App. April 7, 1992) (Whiteside, J., dissenting) (quoting from the opinion of

the trial court).
23 Id.
24 Id.

25 135 N.E. 525, 525, 526 (Ohio 1922) (upholding the statutory predecessor of
§ 3599.09 (A)).
26 McIntyre, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 WL 230505, at *3 (explaining that Babstwas binding on the court); McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1515 (stating that the court of appeals reinstated the fine).
27 Babst, 135 N.E. at 525. The court determined that the required disclosures did
not impair the right of free speech because the statute was "not a restraint or abridgment of the right of free speech, but merely a regulation to prevent anonymous statements that might easily result in fraudulent and corrupt practices." Id. at 526.
28 Id. Although the court determined the constitutionality of the statute under the
Ohio Constitution, the free speech clauses of both the Ohio Constitution and the
United States Constitution provide the same guarantees. McIntyre, No. 90AP-1221,
1992 WL 230505, at *3 n.1. The Ohio Constitution provides, in relevant part, that:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuses of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press." OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 11.
29 McIntyre, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 WL 230505, at *3.
30 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See infta notes 51-53 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the Talley decision.
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Court considered a municipal statute requiring the disclosure of
the name and address of the person responsible for all handbills.3 '
The Talley Court struck down the statute after finding that the municipality was attempting to prohibit all anonymous speech.3 2 The
Ohio Court of Appeals, however, distinguished Talley from Mrs.
McIntyre's situation, asserting that Ohio's interest in protecting
against fraud and elections corruption was stronger than California's interest in avoiding anonymous speech generally.3 3 The dissenting judge, in contrast, reasoned that Talley required a more
narrow interpretation of the Ohio statute to protect the statute's
constitutionality. 4
A divided Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals, determining that the burdens placed on the First
Amendment rights of voters were "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory."'- The majority reasoned that the minor burden of author
identification was outweighed by the state's interests of informing
voters and preventing fraud.3 6 The sole dissenting justice argued
the statute
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test to apply to
37
and concluded that the statute did not meet the test.

31 Id. at 60-61. After explaining the importance of anonymous political speech,
the Talley Court stated that the ordinance's broad reach would undoubtedly restrict
the freedom of expression. Id. at 6465. The Court also rejected the municipality's
claim that the statute was intended to provide a means to identify the sources of
fraudulent statements absent any proof, such as legislative history or a limitation in
the ordinance. Id. at 64.
32 Id. at 64, 65.
33 McIntyre, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 WL 230505 at *3.
34 Id. at *8-*9 (Whiteside, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge responded to one
of the state's second assignment of errors. Id. at *7 (WhitesideJ., dissenting). The
assignment of errors complained that the lower court erred by holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre. Id. at *2. The dissenting judge
concluded that following the Talley decision would require the court to determine
that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at *8 (Whiteside, J., dissenting). Continuing, the dissenting judge determined that only by narrowing the construction of the
statute could the statute be found constitutional. Id. at *9 (Whiteside, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the dissenting judge concluded, even if the lower court erred in finding
the statute unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre, the statute would still have
been found unconstitutional under Talley, absent a more narrow interpretation. Id.
35 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155, 156 (Ohio 1993)
(quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). The majority distinguished Talley because the purpose of the Ohio statute was "the identification of persons who distribute materials containing false statements." Id. at 154.
36 Id. at 155-56. The Ohio Supreme Court relied on dicta in Anderson v. Celebrezze,
in which the United States Supreme Court used a lower level of scrutiny that compares a state's "'important"' interest of regulating elections with the freedom of
speech as represented by Mrs. McIntyre's leaflet distribution. King, supra note 3, at
162 (citing McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155, and quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
37 Id. at 158, 159 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice reasoned that a
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3 8 to determine whether laws banning anonymous leaflets, which discuss
political issues, violate the First Amendment's protection of the
freedom of speech. 9 Upon analyzing the Ohio statute, the Court
recounted the protection historically afforded political speech.4 In
accordance with that traditional protection, the Court held that
Ohio's statute prohibiting anonymous political leaflets violated the
First Amendment.4 1
One important. decision concerning the First Amendment's
protection of the dissemination of ideas through the written word
is Lovell v. City of Griffin.4 2 In Lovel, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
more severe standard was appropriate because of the statute's significant effect on
individual citizens' ability "to freely express their views in writing on political issues."
Id. at 156-57 (Wright, J., dissenting).
38 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 1047 (1994). The executor of
Mrs. McIntyre's estate pursued her claim because Mrs. McIntyre died during the litigation. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516 (1995).
39 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
40 Id. at 1516-17. After its analysis of the political and literary protections historically given to anonymous speech, the Court reviewed its previous decisions that addressed the protection of political speech. Id. at 1518-19.
41 Id. at 1524. The Court concluded by stating that Ohio "cannot seek to punish
fraud indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented." Id. In
reaching that conclusion, Justice Stevens applied the strict scrutiny test of Meyer v.
Grantto determine that the prohibition of anonymous political leaflets is not narrowly
tailored to the state's interest in preventing fraud and informing the electorate. Id. at
1519-21.
In Meyer, the Court unanimously applied the strict scrutiny test to a state law
which criminalized paying petition circulators. Meyer v. Grant 486 U.S. 414, 420-21
(1988). The Meyer Court stated that circulating an initiative petition necessarily "involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the
merits of the proposed change." Id. at 421.
42 303 U.S. 444 (1938). There have been many notable Supreme Court decisions
on First Amendment issues. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983)
(striking down a statute prohibiting the display of flags or banners at the premises of
the United States Supreme Court); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring the right of reply in
newspaper speech); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966) (invalidating a state
law imposing criminal penalties for the publication of a newspaper editorial urging
votes on election day); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958)
(striking down a state order to produce an organization membership list); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that convictions under the Espionage Act were unconstitutional).
The protection given speech and press is provided "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See supra notes 1-3 and
accompanying text (discussing some of the Court's decisions addressing political
speech).
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all literature unless a permit had been obtained from the city manager.43 In striking down the ordinance, Chief Justice Hughes
noted that the freedom of the press is an "essential liberty" that
includes the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets.' Further, the
Chief Justice emphasized that both publishing and distributing are
protected.45
The next year, the Court decided Schneider v. Town of Irving-

ton,46 which addressed the goals of municipal ordinances that limited the distribution of leaflets.47 The towns-Irvington, New
Jersey; Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Worcester, Massachusetts-all enacted ordinances limiting the distribution of leaflets through licensing requirements or complete bans
on leaflet distribution. 48 The municipalities' purported goals were
the prevention of fraud, disorder, and/or littering.49 After consid43 Id. at 445. The Court held that the ordinance was void on its face. Id. at 451.
Alma Lovell was convicted of being in violation of the city ordinance and sentenced to
50 days in jail in default of a $50 fine. Id. at 447. Ms. Lovell's violation consisted of
distributing pamphlets and magazines espousing the gospel of the "Kingdom ofJehovah" without obtaining the required permit. Id. at 448.
The Court stated that the issue of whether the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was presented in Coleman v. City of Griffin. Love,
303 U.S. at 449 (citing Coleman v. City of Griffin, 302 U.S. 636, 636 (1937) (dismissing the appeal for lack of a federal question)).
44 Id. at 452. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that
"[t] he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Id.
45 Id. "'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."' Id.
(quoting Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
46 308 U.S. 147 (1939). For a general discussion of the Court's decision in Schneider, see TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-23, at 984-85.
47 Id. at 162-64.
48 Id. at 154, 155, 156, 157-58. The Court granted certiorari in the Irvington and
Milwaukee cases and noted jurisdiction in the Los Angeles and Worcester cases. Id. at
154 n.I. The appellant from Los Angeles distributed handbills advertising a meeting
about the war in Spain. Id. at 154. The petitioner from Milwaukee distributed handbills in front of a meat market discussing a labor dispute with the market. Id. at 155.
Some of the persons who received the handbills threw them into the Milwaukee
street. Id. The appellants from Worcester distributed leaflets advertising a meeting
protesting unemployment insurance policies. Id. at 156. Some of the persons who
received the leaflets also threw them into the Worcester streets. Id. at 157. The petitioner from Irvington visited houses as one of "Jehovah's Witnesses." Id. at 158.
49 Id. at 162-64. The Court rejected the municipalities' efforts to distinguish their
ordinances from the one voided in Griffin because of their goals of preventing fraud
and litter. Id. at 162, 164. Justice Roberts observed that "the public convenience in
respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power
which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the
Constitution." Id. at 163. The Court noted that municipal authorities "may lawfully
regulate the conduct of those using the streets" only if the legislation "does not
abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart informa-
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ering the issue, the Court held that these goals could be accomplished by legitimate means other than restricting the freedom of
speech and press.5 0
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of a municipal
ordinance requiring the disclosure of the name and address of a
5 1 The Talley Court
publication's sponsor in Talley v. California.
noted the important role that anonymous publications have played
in shaping the history of the United States.52 The Court held that
the ordinance was void on its face because its required disclosures
could inhibit peaceful discourse of important public matters.5
tion through speech or the distribution of literature." Id. at 160. Tribe notes that
"[i]t is not a sufficient justification that the only alternatives available to government
would be 'less efficient and convenient.'" TRiBE, supra note 1, § 12-23, at 980 n.6
(quoting Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164)). Continuing, Tribe states that "a governmental
action that excludes a communication from such a public forum cannot be defended
by pointing to the availability of alternative ways to transmit the same message ....
Id. § 12-23, at 981.
50 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162, 164. Justice Roberts stated that any resulting litter in
town streets from the distribution of leaflets was "an indirect consequence ... from
the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press" and could not justify abridging the freedom of speech. Id. at 162. Justice Roberts further stated that
"[t]here are obvious methods of preventing littering" and suggested that the towns
simply punish those people who actually litter. Id. Similarly, Justice Roberts suggested that the goal of preventing fraud could be achieved by punishing fraudulent
statements and trespassing. Id. at 164. Further, the Court may find an otherwise permissible statute "invalid if it leaves too little breathing space for ... would-be speakers
or would-be listeners." TRIBE, supra note 1, §12-23, at 978-79.
51 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The Los Angeles, California ordinance required that the
name and address of the handbill's author, printer, or distributor be printed on its
face. Id. at 60-61. The handbills distributed by Mr. Talley urged a boycott of certain
named merchants because of alleged discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 61.
See also King, supra note 3, at 152-54 (providing an analysis of the TaLey case).
52 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65. The Court noted that the press licensing laws of England and Colonial America were enforced largely because the governments knew that
the publications criticizing the governments would be lessened if the names of the
authors and distributors were exposed. Id. at 64. The Court also noted that the Federalist Papers had been published under fictitious names. Id. at 65. The importance
of Talley "lies in the strong words used by the Court to describe anonymous political
speech." King, supra note 3, at 153 (quotation omitted). See also Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity, supra note 7, at 1084-1104 (discussing the historical role
and cases addressing anonymous speech).
See generallyKreimer, supra note 7 (discussing past and current arguments for and
against and effects of disclosures).
53 Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that this potential deterrence of political speech was the same problem as with statutes previously struck down by the Court
that required groups to publicly identify their members. Id. (citing Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring
local branch of the NAACP to disclose its membership list in order to maintain its taxexempt status) and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958)
(striking down state order compelling disclosure of the organization's membership
list)).
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The Court also has considered the First Amendment's protections of political speech in the area of election laws.5 4 In Buckley v.
Valeo,5 5 the Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974.56 The Court
upheld provisions of the Act that limited campaign contributions
by individuals 57 and required disclosures of such contributions. 58
The Court struck down certain spending restrictions that substanThe test resulting from Talley is whether anonymous political speech, as a form of
highly protected speech, is covered by the statute at issue. King, supra note 3, at 154.
"Talley is right, not because disclosure is valueless, but because anonymity is more
valuable." Kreimer, supra note 7, at 88.
54 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (1995). In the
McIntyre opinion, Justice Stevens noted that the Court had previously reviewed statutes that governed the voting process itself. Id. In such situations, a state's interests
must be carefully compared with the burdens placed on political speech. Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). The Court stated that "'even when pursuing a
legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty."' Id. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59
(1973) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972))). SeeBurson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 198-99, 210 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to uphold law prohibiting campaign-related speech within certain distance from polling
places); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-25 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate law prohibiting payment of petition circulators); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806 (striking down filing deadlines for independent candidates for President). See also TRIBE,
supra note 1, §§ 13-18 to 13-31, at 1097-1153 (discussing the Court's decisions addressing state and federal regulation of various aspects of elections). See generally Note,
Gutter Politics and the First Amendment, 6 VAL. U.L. Rlv. 185 (1972) (discussing election
laws designed to regulate conduct during campaigns and elections).
55 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). See generally Garrison, supra note 5 (discussing
corporate participation in the political process).
56 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6. See also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-27, at 1132-33 (describing
the motivation behind and goals of the 1974 amendment to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971).
57 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35. Individual contributions to political committees and
candidates were limited to $1000. Id. at 23. The Court observed that contributions by
individuals to candidates were merely "symbolic" acts of general support of candidates. Id. at 21. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that any limitations on contributions by individuals only marginally restricted the individual's freedom of speech. Id.
at 20-21. Continuing, the Court noted that individuals were free to discuss and communicate support of the candidates and issues. Id. at 21. See also TRIBE, supra note 1,
§ 13-28, at 1136-38 (discussing the Court's reasoning for upholding the contribution
limitations).
58 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84. The disclosure requirements imposed upon political
committees and candidates required that detailed records of contributions be maintained; those records were subject to periodic audits and were required to be reported on a quarterly basis. Id. at 63. Other individuals or groups making
contributions in excess of $100 to other than political committees or candidates were
also subject to reporting requirements. Id. at 63-64. The Court determined that the
disclosure requirements met the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 68. The Court found that
the governmental interests of voter education, corruption deterrence, and violations
detection were substantial. Id. at 66-68. Further, the Court found that the disclosure
requirements "directly serve[d the] substantial governmental interests." Id. at 68. See
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tially limited protected political expression.5 9 The Court reasoned
that the surviving provisions furnished the means of campaign reform least offensive to First Amendment freedoms.6"
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state criminal statute restricting political expression
by corporations in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.6" In that
case, the Court struck down a Massachusetts criminal statute
prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures designed to
influence any vote unless the vote materially affected the corporation's assets, business, or property. 62 In so ruling, the Court reasoned that discussing governmental affairs was an indispensable
form of speech regardless of the speaker.6 3
also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-31, at 1151-52 (discussing the Court's rationale for upholding the disclosure requirements).
59 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59. See also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-29, at 1141-43 (discussing the Court's analysis supporting its decision to strike down the expenditure
limitations).
For example, the Court struck down the sections providing a ceiling on independent expenditures, a limitation on expenditures from a candidate's own personal funds, and a ceiling on overall campaign expenditures. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
The Court determined that those sections imposed substantial and direct restrictions
on protected political expression exercised by candidates, citizens, and associations.
Id. at 58-59. The Court "distinguished between limits on campaign expenditures, considered to be at the core of the first amendment, and restrictions on campaign contributions, which the Court found to involve little direct restraint on speech." TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 13-27, at 1136.
60 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29, 68. The Court observed that the limitations on contributions "do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues. . . ." Id. at 28-29. Although "the
Court has consistendy recognized the state's interest in preventing actual or perceived
corruption of elected officials arising from their indebtedness to large campaign donors,
it has never accepted as legitimate any asserted interest in preventing actual or perceived corruption of the electoral system itself. ..

."

TRIBE, supranote 1, § 13-28, at 1136.

The Buckley Court further observed that the disclosure requirements afforded "the
least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption
....
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
61 435 U.S. 765, 767-68, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). See also TRIBE, supra note
1, § 12-3, at 795-96 (discussing the Court's rationale in First Nat'7 Bank) and Garrison,
supra note 5, at 178-81 (discussing First Nat'l Bank).
62 First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 795. The appellants, national banking associations
and business corporations, planned to make expenditures to publicize their position
on a vote on a proposed state constitutional amendment. Id. at 769. The proposed
amendment would permit a graduated income tax on individuals. Id. Although the
vote on the referendum was held and the proposed amendment defeated, the Court
decided that the case was not moot because it was "'capable of repetition, yet evading
review .... .'" Id. at 774 (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
63 Id. at 777. The Court explained that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source .... " Id. Speech is protected, not the speaker. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at
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Recently, the Court revisited the issue of a municipal ordinance restricting political speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo.6 4 There,
the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting most residential
signs, reasoning that the ordinance nearly foreclosed an important
medium of political speech.6 5 The Court reasoned that although
796 (discussing the Court's First Amendment analysis in First Nat'l Bank that focuses
on the speech and not just on the speaker, and that "speaker-based restrictions on
speech may amount to impermissible censorship of the flow of ideas and information
regarding the relevant set of listeners even if the speakers subject to restriction cannot
complain that their rights as speakers have been violated"). Continuing, the Court
noted that First Amendment freedoms, including the freedom of speech, are encompassed by the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at
780. See supranote 4 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment).
The Court further noted that the source of such rights, even when the rights are
asserted by corporations, is the same for corporations as it is for individuals. First Nat '
Bank, 435 U.S. at 780. Additionally, the Court stated that the role of the First Amendment encompasses fostering speech by individuals and advancing the public's access
to the discussion and communication of ideas. Id. at 783. Accordingly, the Court's
opinion emphasized that speech is protected by the First Amendment whether or not
the particular speaker is protected. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at 795.
64 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (1994). The ordinance and the subsequent variance denial by the city council prohibited Ms. Gilleo from displaying a sign protesting the war
in the Persian Gulf in a window in her home. Id. After the District Court issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the ordinance, Ms. Gilleo
hung an 8.5 by 11-inch sign in a window on the second floor of her home. Id. Then,
the city council repealed the original ordinance, enacting a replacement ordinance
with the same restrictions. Id. The replacement ordinance, however, included an
extensive statement of purposes detailing the city's findings resulting in its goal of
minimizing visual clutter. Id. at 2041. See also Howard, supra note 5, at 366-68 (discussing the Court's rationales in the Gi//eo decision).
65 Gi/!eo, 114 S. Ct. at 2045, 2047. Both the original and the replacement ordinances prohibited all residential signs, with 10 exemptions. Id. at 2040-41. The exemptions permitted signs, subject to size limitations, for identification purposes,
advertising property for sale or rent, for not-for-profit institutions, and commercially
zoned districts. Id. at 2041.
The Court noted the importance and distinctive nature of residential signs during the course of political campaigns. Id. at 2045. Residential signs, because of their
convenience and low cost, are a form of political expression easily accessed by most
members of society. Id. at 2046. The Court also noted that its prior decisions had
invalidated laws foreclosing an entire medium of expression. Id. at 2045 (citingJamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415-17 (1943) (handbills on public streets); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943) (door-to-door distribution of literature);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (pamphlets within a municipality)).
Formerly, the Court had carefully scrutinized seemingly neutral statutes, foreclosing methods of communication, which disproportionately affected the poor. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 12-23, at 979. Recently, however, the Court has been reluctant to apply
a higher amount of scrutiny to laws which disadvantage the poor when conveying
their political speech. Id. § 12-23, at 979 n.5. The importance of the Gilleo Court's
approach, however, is that the Court recognized an individual's right to "participate
effectively in public debate" and the political process. Howard, supra note 5, at 35758.
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the municipality was permitted to regulate the physical qualities of
a sign, the prohibition of certain signs necessarily resulted in the
prohibition of certain messages, which violates the Constitution.6 6
In accordance with these past decisions protecting political
speech,6 7 the Court similarly protected anonymous political speech
in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.6 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, addressed the extent of First Amendment protection afforded to anonymous leaflets designed to influence the vot66 Gileo, 114 S.Ct. at 2041-42. The Court noted that residents and property owners have strong incentives to minimize "visual clutter" to maintain property values. Id.
at 2047. The Court further noted that "mere regulations" of signs may be a permissible alternative to the city's almost total ban of residential signs. Id. at 2047 n.17. The
Court's decision provides a "map for courts navigating the difficult road between" an
individual's right to political speech and a state's right to regulate property usage.
Howard, supra note 5, at 349.
The Court stated that it could decide the case without determining whether the
ordinance's exemptions amounted to content or viewpoint discrimination. Gilleo, 114
S. Ct. at 2044, 2044 n.ll. Accordingly, the Court commented that the first question to
be determined was whether the city might properly prohibit Ms. Gilleo from displaying her sign. Id. at 2044. The Court noted that a secondary issue involved deciding
whether "it was improper for the City simultaneously to permit certain other signs." Id.
Regarding the first issue, the Court reasoned that residential signs are an inexpensive and convenient medium of political speech. Id. at 2046. The Court further
noted that residential signs are distinctive from other forms of communication because their location provides the additional information of the speaker's identity. Id.
The Court noted that "the identity of the speaker is an important component of many
attempts to persuade." Id. (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court held that the
city could not prohibit Ms. Gilleo from displaying her sign. Id. at 2047.
With regard to the second issue-prohibiting some signs while permitting
others-the Court briefly commented that its holding did not require "that every kind
of sign must be permitted in residential areas." Id. at 2047 n.17.
67 See id. at 2046 (stating that residential signs are important vehicles for political
speech); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1983) (holding that an early
filing deadline for candidacy was an unconstitutional burden on political speech);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (stating that political speech is
"indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy"), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29, 58-59 (1976) (noting that limitations on political
contributions and expenditures necessarily limit political speech). These cases
demonstrate that the Supreme Court has determined the extent of the First Amendment's protection of political speech by examining a variety of laws, including federal
and state statutes which range from election laws to zoning ordinances. See infra note
68 (discussing the historical protection of political speech as noted by the McIntyre
Court).
68 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995). Justice Stevens noted that the Talley Court's reasoning followed a "respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political
causes." Id. at 1517 (footnote omitted). Continuing, Justice Stevens identified the
anonymously authored Federalist Papers as the embodiment of this tradition. Id. at
1517 n.6. The Court also noted that the most effective advocates in the field of political rhetoric have occasionally opted for anonymity, even though "'the identity of the
speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade' ....
" Id. at 1517
(quoting Gil/eo, 114 S.Ct. at 2046 (footnote omitted)).
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ing process. 69 The Court answered that the First Amendment
provides the broadest protection to anonymous core political
speech.7 °

The majority began its analysis by recounting the historical importance of anonymous writings.7 1 Justice Stevens stated that the
Court in Talley recognized and accepted the long history of advocating political causes anonymously. 72 An anonymous message can
be evaluated on its own merits, the Justice explained, free from the
prejudice that may attach when the author's identity is known. 73
Next, the majority discussed the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to be applied to the statute.7 1 Justice Stevens concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate level of review
because the statute regulated pure speech. 75 The Justice determined that the statute was a regulation of pure speech for two rea69 Id. at 1518-19. Because "a ban on anonymous pamphleteering falls with much
greater force upon individuals and groups who fear majoritarian disapproval and reprisal . ..than upon those with widely approved messages to deliver," the Court demands "more than minimal justification" for this type of a ban. TRIBE, supra note 1,
§ 12-23, at 980.
70 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518-19 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text
(discussing the protection afforded political speech).

71 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64
(1960)). Justice Stevens noted that the Talley Court recognized the value of anonymous publications that allow oppressed groups to criticize government practices and
laws. Id. (citing Talley, 362 U.S. at 64). Further, the Justice stated that anonymous
publications ensure that a reader will not be biased by the author's name. Id. at 1517.
See also King, supra note 3, at 163-64 (reviewing the historical role of anonymous political writings).
72 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517. Specifically, Justice Stevens discussed
the use of
anonymous writings during the pre-Revolutionary and Colonial years in America. Id.
at 1517 n.6. The Justice stated that advocating political causes anonymously is most
famously represented by the Federalist Papers, which were "authored by James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but signed 'Publius."' Id.
73 Id. at 1517. Justice Stevens emphasized this point by stating that "even in the
field of political rhetoric, where 'the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade,' the most effective advocates have sometimes
opted for anonymity." Id. (quoting Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2046 (footnote omitted)). To
help illustrate this point, Justice Stevens cited the use of assumed names by many
famous American, French, and British authors. Id. at 1516 n.4.
74 Id.

at 1518.

75 Id. at 1519. Justice Stevens stated that the Ohio Supreme Court's application of
a "significantly more lenient standard" was in contradiction to the United States
Supreme Court's decisions applying strict scrutiny to laws burdening core political
speech. Id. The "exacting scrutiny" level of review requires that a statute's burden on
free speech be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to be
constitutional. Id. Justice Stevens uses the term "exacting scrutiny" rather than "strict
scrutiny." See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing "strict scrutiny").
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sons.7 6 First, Justice Stevens specified that the statute regulated the
content of speech because it required certain disclosures of identity in all documents covered by the statute. 7 7 Second, the Justice
determined that the statute was a content-based restriction because
it regulated only documents containing speech designed to influence the electoral process.' Justice Stevens noted that political
speech that advocated a politically-controversial viewpoint during a
referendum vote is entitled to the highest level of protection.7 9
76 Id. at 1518. The Court opined that the state was controlling the content of the
message by requiring the disclosure of information that the author would otherwise
omit. Id. at 1518, 1520. The Court explained that the required disclosures facilitate
extrajudicial harassment that may discourage other authors from writing, thereby
abridging speech. King, supra note 3, at 158 (discussing the benefits of anonymous
political speech).
Justice Stevens reported that the Ohio Elections Commission relied on previous
Supreme Court decisions that dealt with election code provisions regulating the voting process itself. Mdntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
430 (1992) (write-in voting); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (filing
deadlines); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1974) (ballot access)). In contrast,
Justice Stevens observed that the Ohio statute does not control the workings of the
voting process. Id.
77 Id. Justice Stevens noted that the statute required the disclosure of "'the name
and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.'" Id. (quoting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)). By
requiring the disclosure that might not otherwise be in the publication, the Court
recognized that the statute was controlling the content of the message. Id.; see also
King, supra note 3, at 162 ("Disclosure statutes do ... affect the content of campaign

literature . .

").

Mdntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518. Justice Stevens noted that only documents
"'designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in any election'" were within the statute's coverage. Id. at 1518 n.9. (quoting OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)).
79 Id. at 1519. Justice Stevens identified Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets as core political
speech. Id. Justice Stevens emphasized that "[n]o form of speech is entitled to
greater constitutional protection" than "urgent, important, and effective speech ...
lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed." Id.
Nearly half a century ago, the Supreme Court described the importance of political speech, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The Court explained that:
a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would
78
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To pass the strict scrutiny test, a statute must serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to that interest.8 0 In applying
the strict scrutiny test to the Ohio statute, Justice Stevens identified
Ohio's interests as informing the electorate and preventing
fraud.8 ' The Justice found that the interest of informing the electorate was not a compelling state interest because the required disclosures provided information that would be of little or no value to
the reader.8 2 Justice Stevens next determined that Ohio's interest
in preventing fraud was a compelling state interest.8 " The Justice
explained, however, that this statute was not narrowly tailored to
serve this interest and that the state had other statutes to prevent
fraud.8 4 Justice Stevens concluded, therefore, that the Ohio statute
lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
In Mcntyre Justice Stevens discussed the Court's rationale for recognizing the
First Amendment's broad protection of political speech. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 151819. Justice Stevens reiterated the FirstNat'l Bank Court's acknowledgment that political speech extended beyond speech about candidates, but also included discourse
during issue-based elections. Id. at 1519. The Justice also reiterated previous decisions acknowledging the distribution of leaflets as a protected medium of political
speech. Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705
(1992); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)). "[H]anding out leaflets in the
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint-is the essence of First Amendment
expression." Id.
80 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
81 McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1519. Justice Stevens noted that although Ohio's stated
interests overlapped to a certain extent, the Court would address them separately. Id.
Although Ohio identified one of its interests supporting the statute as "preventing fraudulent and libelous statements," the Court refers to this interest as an interest
in preventing "fraud," id. at 1521, "false statements," id. at 1520, 1521, "libel," id. at
1521, and "false documents," id. at 1522.
82 Id. at 1520. The Court judged Ohio's "informational interest . . . [as] plainly
insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement." Id. Justice
Stevens agreed with the New York Supreme Court's findings in a similar case when
that court stated: "People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can
evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they
must be, to read that message." Id. at 1520 n.11 (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351
N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974)). Tribe, however, would likely disagree stating that because
this state interest helps the electorate better assess campaign literature and "is not so
readily protected by other means[,] ...carefully drafted campaign literature disclosure laws should probably be deemed constitutionally permissible." TRIBE, supra note
1, § 13-27, at 1132 (footnote omitted).
83 McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1520. Justice Stevens agreed with Ohio that "this interest
carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited,
may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large." Id.
84 Id. at 1520-21. Justice Stevens noted that the Ohio Election Code has other
sections specifically prohibiting false statements during campaigns. Id. at 1520 (referring to OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.09.1(B) and 3599.09.2 (B)). "To the extent that
the purpose of a disclosure statute is prevention of false statements, a narrower solu-
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8 5

was unconstitutional.

Finally, the Court addressed Ohio's claim that the Court's
precedents adequately support the disclosure requirement.8 6 The
Court stated that neither FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti 7 nor
Buckley v. ValeoP8 was controlling.8 9 Justice Stevens reasoned that
the Ohio statute's burdens on speech were more intrusive than
those of the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti or the federal act at
issue in Buckley. 90
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed
agreement with the Court's holding that the First Amendment protion is available: a ban on the false statements themselves .... " King, supranote 3, at
155 (footnote omitted). In accord, Professor Tribe notes that although "[t]he interest in preventing candidate defamation is certainly significant ...it seems achievable
by the less restrictive alternative of enforcing anti-fraud campaign falsity statutes."
TIuBE, supra note 1, § 13-26, at 1132. Finally, Justice Stevens found that because the
prohibition against anonymous leafletting was not the primary means of preventing
fraud, these secondary benefits did not justify the statute's "extremely broad prohibition." McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1521.
85 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1521. Justice Stevens noted that the statute applies to
"documents that are not even arguably false or misleading." Id. Further, Justice Stevens found that Ohio's enforcement interest was unsubstantiated because the state
had not shown how it could address falsified names or that the absence of an author's
name necessarily permitted the author from escaping compliance with the statute, as
was the case with Mrs. McIntyre. Id. at 1522. Additionally, Justice Stevens commented
that the ban applied without regard to the "strength of the author's interest in anonymity." Id. Accordingly, the Justice noted that Ohio's enforcement interest may be
appropriately served by a more limited disclosure requirement. Id.
86
87

Id.
435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (explaining that "[i ] dentification of the source of adver-

tising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected"), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978). See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing First Nat'l Bank of
Boston).
88 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (sustaining disclosure requirements in part due to the
information that would be provided to voters). See supra notes 55-60 and accompany-

ing text (discussing the Buckley decision).
89 McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1522.
90 Id. at 1522, 1523. Justice Stevens noted that the First Nat'! Bank Court recognized that the " ' inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public"' was not dependent upon the identification of its source. Id. at 1522
(quoting First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777). Justice Stevens further noted that while
dicta in the First Nat'l Bank opinion commented on the beneficial effects of source
identification of corporate advertising, such comments were not necessarily applicable to independent speech by individuals like Mrs. McIntyre. Id.
Justice Stevens observed that the expenditure disclosures required under the federal act in Buckley revealed far less specific information than the authorship of a statement on a controversial issue like that contained in Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets. Id. at
1523. Justice Stevens also stated that the disclosures at issue in Buckley were in support
of a compelling state interest of avoiding corruption resulting from campaign expenditures which was not a concern during the referendum vote commented on by
Mrs. McIntyre. Id.
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hibited a state ban on anonymous political leaflets.9 1 The Justice
wrote separately to defend the majority's analysis and conclusion.92
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court's holding
would not preclude a more narrow identification requirement.9 3
Justice Thomas also concurred with the majority's holding,
but wrote separately to explain why the majority's analysis was improper.9 4 The Justice emphasized that the proper analysis involved
determining the Founders's original understanding of the Free
Press clause of the First Amendment.9 5 Justice Thomas opined that
the historical view on constitutional interpretation was dependent
upon the original meanings of the words and the Founders' understanding of those words at the time when the Constitution was
adopted.9 6 After a considerable review of the customs and beliefs
held by the Founders regarding anonymous political writings,9 7 the
Justice concluded that the Founders believed that the right to publish anonymous writings on political issues was included in the freedom of the press.9 8
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the majority should have followed the traditional
method of constitutional interpretation, which is to analyze the
Constitution's original meaning.9 9 Under that method of analysis,
Justice Scalia found that there is no right to be anonymous while
participating in the electoral process. 10 0 Further, the dissenting
Id. at 1524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Ginsburg found the majority's application of First Amendment jurisprudence "hardly sensational" in contrast to the charges by the dissent. Id.
93 Id. Justice Ginsburg stated that "[i]n for a calf is not always in for a cow." Id.
The Justice explained that the Court's holding does not mean "that the State may not
in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interests by disclosing its identity." Id.
94 Id. at 1525 (Thomas,J, concurring). Justice Thomas criticized that the majority
was not following the "settled approach" of interpreting the Constitution by exploring
the intent of the Founders. Id. at 1530 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1525. Justice Thomas cited to Supreme Court decisions supporting his
position of discerning the Constitutional guarantees' original meanings and the
Founders' contemporaneous understanding of those guarantees to properly analyze
the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
657, 721 (1838); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905); citing
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983)).
97 Id. at 1525-29 (ThomasJ., concurring).
98 Id. at 1530 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 1531-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia rejected Justice Thomas's
determination that historical evidence supported a right to anonymous political communications. Id. at 1532 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the historical evidence examined by Justice Thomas did not specifically address anonymous
91
92
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Justice observed that the widespread and longstanding nature of
the governmental practice of prohibiting anonymous political communications provides additional support for finding the practice
constitutional.'
Justice Scalia further asserted that an analysis of the Supreme
Court's precedent would result in the same conclusion.1 0 2 The Justice advanced that the Court's prior decisions authorized the protections of the electoral process at the expense of a "right to
anonymity."10 ' Justice Scalia stated that, contrary to the majority's
assertion, democratic elections are protected and enhanced by the
prohibition of anonymous campaigning. 10 4
electioneering. Id. Justice Scalia further noted that the issue of anonymous electioneering never arose because the idea of government regulation of the voting process
was a modem phenomenon. Id.
101 Id. at 1532-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
After determining that the original meaning of the Free Speech and Press
Clauses was not dispositive, Justice Scalia examined the governmental traditions. Id.
Justice Scalia opined that the fundamental constitutional guarantees become embodied in the widespread and longstanding traditions and practices imparting them with
the "strong presumption of constitutionality." Id. at 1532 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But
see Kreimer, supra note 7, at 13 n.30. Kreimer argues that "[h]istory functions best as
a warning, rather than a stamp of approval[,]" asserting that Justice Scalia's theory
that "traditions of tacit toleration for government practices constitutionally validate
those practices" is "misguided and misleading ...." Id.
The Justice noted that when the Ohio statute was enacted in 1915 it joined a
similar statute enacted by Massachusetts in 1890. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1532-33
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice further noted that by the end of World War I, 24
states had enacted similar laws and that today the District of Columbia and every state,
except California, have enacted similar laws. Id. at 1533 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1534 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1534-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). First, Justice Scalia stated that the case law
established that the state's protection of the electoral process is the most compelling
justification for regulation. Id. at 1534 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice explained
that "[t]he State has a 'compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election
process.'" Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). Second, Justice Scalia noted that several cases have provided
exemptions from otherwise valid disclosure requirements but have not recognized a
general right to anonymity in speech. Id. at 1534-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (prohibiting a state from compelling disclosure of minor political parties' membership lists
when such disclosure would subject those persons to a reasonable probability of
threats or reprisals); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (striking
down a municipal ordinance requiring the furnishing of a membership list as a prerequisite to maintaining tax-exempt status to protect members from harassment and
bodily harm); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63, 466 (1958)
(striking down a state order to produce an organization membership list because of
reprisals against members following previous disclosures)).
104 Id. at 1535-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the disclosure
requirements work to protect against campaign falsehoods and promote "a civil and
dignified level of campaign debate . . . ." Id. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Justice noted that the Court "approved much more onerous disclosure requirements"
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In McIntyre, the Supreme Court continued its tradition of protecting political speech.' °5 The Court's focus, however, has begun
to encompass the protection of an individual's right to participate
in the political process. 106 Although the Court's focus is on the
protection of political speech, the protection of the speaker's ability to speak is an indirect result of recent decisions.
In the Court's recent decision in Meyer, for example, the Court
focused on an individual's ability to discuss political change with
others."0 7 The Meyer Court struck down the law criminalizing payments to petition circulators because the petition circulators, by
persuading people to sign petitions, engage in political discussion
and because the petitions provide a greater audience for the discussion through ballot access.' 0 8 In another example from the
year before McIntyre, the Gilleo Court was concerned with the individual's ability to publicly comment on the political process." 9
The Gilleo Court rejected the near total ban on residential signs
because of their unique ability to communicate a resident's
message. ° In McIntyre, the Court similarly continued to emphasize the protection of political speech while mentioning concern
for Mrs. McIntyre's right to distribute her leaflets without the
for the protection and enhancement of elections in Buckley v. Valeo. Id. See supra note
58 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements upheld in Buckley).
Lastly, Justice Scalia noted that the governments of 49 states, Australia, Canada,
and England have determined that the prohibition of anonymous electioneering is an
effective protection of the electoral process. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
105 See supra notes 1-7, 54-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions protecting political speech).
106 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (describing the implications of
"this newly expanded right-to-speak incognito"). See also Howard, supranote 5, at 35382, 396-98 (discussing the Court's move towards formally announcing an individual's
right to participate in public debate); TRIBE, supra note 1, §§ 13-1 to 13-31, at 10621153 (discussing the Court's decisions affecting an individual's right to participate in
the political process).
107 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988). See supra note 41 (discussing further
the Court's reasoning in Meyer).
108 Id. at 421-22. The Court determined that the law restricted political expression
by limiting the number of people who could convey the message and by lessening the
likelihood that the issue would be placed on the ballot. Id. at 422-23.
109 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994). See also Howard, supranote
5, at 351 (stating that the Gilleo Court's concern was "not only with a citizen's right to
receive undistorted political information, but also with the citizen's right to personally
and effectively participate in public debate"). See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text (discussing Gilleo).
110 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2046. The Gilleo Court was concerned with the foreclosure of
residential signs as a medium for political communication for the poor because of its
low cost and for the rich because of its relative ease and cost effectiveness. Id.
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threat of reprisals.'1 1 Although the McIntyre Court did not foreclose the constitutionality of identification requirements for certain groups or corporations, the Court definitively prohibited
12
identification requirements for individuals."
The Court has long recognized the right of an individual to
participate within the context of groups.1 1 ' Similar to the Court's
expansion of the definition of the Due Process Clause to include
most of the Bill of Rights, the Court is effectively enlarging the
individual's protection under the First Amendment. Following this
reasoning, First Amendment jurisprudence may ultimately explicitly include the individual's ability to participate in the political
process.
It is not only the dissent, however, that has voiced a concern
with recognizing an individual's right to anonymous political
speech." 4 Justice Stevens argued that society places a greater value
on free speech than in preventing the possible result of its abuse
shielding fraudulent conduct. 11 5 In accordance with the Court's
decision in McIntyre, the New Jersey Legislature recently amended
the state law to permit individuals to legally distribute anonymous
political leaflets." 6 One of the bill's sponsors, however, was quick
111 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519. The McIntyre Court continued to emphasize the
protection afforded the speech and, necessarily, its speaker. Id. at 1524. The Court
explained that the First Amendment protects "individuals from retaliation-and their
ideas from suppression .... " Id. Continuing, the Court stated that "our society
accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."
Id. The Court noted that the Ohio statute in fact applied to "individuals acting independently and using only their own modest resources." Id. at 1521. The Court also
noted that the intrusive nature of the Ohio statute revealed "unmistakably the content of [an individual's] thoughts on a controversial issue." Id. at 1523.
112 Id. at 1522, 1524. The majority concluded that "[o]ne would be hard pressed to
think of a better example of the pitfalls of Ohio's blunderbuss approach than the
facts of the case before us." Id. at 1524.
113 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (striking down the state's requirement of disclosing the group's membership list because
the threat of reprisals restricted members' right to associate). Justice Scalia, however,
argued that the Court's rationale in the groups cases did not extend to Mrs. McIntyre
because the record did not show that she feared any threats or reprisals. McIntyre, 115
S. Ct. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-34
(1960); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466)).
114 Justice Scalia predicted that the level of civility in elections would decrease as he
envisioned the increasing incidents of "mudslinging" under the cloak of anonymity.
McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1524. Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that there may be "unpalatable consequences" from permitting anonymous political speech, the Justice concluded that value of free speech was much greater in this case. Id.
116 Michael Booth, LegislatureEases Route for Lone Pamphleteer,143 N.J.L.J., January 8,
1996, at 8 (reporting that a bill requiring a name and address disclosure by anyone
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to warn individual who would distribute anonymous leaflets1 under
17
the new law against using the law to make false statements.
Under the guise of protecting the right to free speech as encompassed by the First Amendment, the Legislature has effectively
enhanced the individual's ability to participate in the political process. Thus, this law not only articulates the legality of writing anonymously, but in fact provides a greater ability for the individual to
participate generally. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how the
political process will be affected by the individual's new "right."
Julia L. Luongo

spending $500 or more producing political literature passed both houses of the state
legislature).
117 Id. (reporting that the sponsor stated that "[t]his legislation serves notice to
groups or individuals who may now be tempted to disseminate deliberately false and
damaging advertisements under the cloak of the U.S. Constitution"). Continuing, the
sponsor urged "New Jersey to take a pre-emptive strike against those who would exploit the Supreme Court decision by engaging in covert and anonymous campaign
tactics." Id. Clearly, the bill's sponsor had concerns similar to those of Justice Scalia
in McIntyre. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice
Scalia concluded his dissent by stating that anonymous writing "facilitates wrong by
eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity." Id.

